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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused various disruptions in the production chains of 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). Among other disruptions there is a drop of product 
sales, often due to lock-down measures, which resulted in last-minute order cancella-
tions, non-payment of the already purchased resources and already made products, 
and hence terminations of employment contracts. International organisations and non-
governmental organisations have called upon MNEs to take their corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) and honour the contracts. The aim of this article is to analyse to 
what extend this moral appeal is also a (quasi-)legal appeal following from interna-
tional norms on CSR. After an assessment of the main labour law problems caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, an analysis follows on each of the identified problems. 
The conclusion of the analysis is that MNEs indeed are not only morally obliged to 
take their responsibility, but also based on the (quasi-)legal international CSR norms.
Keywords: CSR, COVID-19, UN Guiding Principles, global production chains, MNEs, 
ILO, Responsible Business Conduct, RBC.
1. Introduction
In times of the COVID-19 pandemic corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) is even more important than in normal times.1 However, 
although there are strong moral appeals on MNEs (Multinational En-
* Visiting professor and Head of the Centre for International and European Labour 
Law Studies at the University of Warsaw, and Assistant Professor and Academic Coor-
dinator of the Advanced Master Global and European Labour Law at Leiden University. 
1 In this introduction I try to substantiate the importance of CSR with as many ref-
erences as I could and is sensible. However, developments are extremely fast, which 
makes it impossible to keep up with all of them. Most of all, this indicates how topical 
the issue is at the moment of writing this article.
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terprises) to take their responsibility, the question is whether MNEs 
are also required to act responsibly by (quasi-)legal instruments? More 
particularly these instruments are: the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (fur-
ther: MNE Declaration), the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises (further: OECD Guidelines), and the UN Guiding Principles 
on business and human rights (further: UN GPs) including the Ruggie 
framework protect, respect and remedy. 
Before addressing the above question more elaborately, we need 
to take one step back and review what is happening in these times of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussions about MNEs and their supply 
chains started when parts of China went into lockdown and concerns 
were raised that some products might become scarce2 because ever 
since the 1980s companies in Europe, the United States of America 
(US) and Australia have massively outsourced their production pro-
cesses to China and other Asian countries.3 When COVID-19 was de-
clared a global pandemic, and Europe, Australia and the US went 
into lockdown in March 20204 another effect of the outsourcing prac-
tices of companies became strongly visible. Due to the lockdowns, 
consumption levels decreased in unprecedented numbers,5 which
2 For example, E. White, S. Jung-a, J. Miller and P. Cambell, EU and US carmakers 
warn ‘weeks away’ from China parts shortage, ‘Financial Times’ 4 February 2020; M. Davey, 
From batteries to shutters: Australian firms eye potential coronavirus shortages, ‘The Guardian’ 
21 February 2020; A. Cheng, P&G Says 17,600 Products Could Be Affected By Coronavirus In 
China, Highlighting Supply Chain Risk, ‘Forbes’ 20 February 2020; J. Christensen, Corona-
virus outbreak in China could lead to ‘critical’ shortages of medical products in the US, ‘CNN’ 
26 February 2020; and D. Ivanov, Predicting the impacts of epidemic outbreaks on global sup-
ply chains: A simulation-based analysis on the coronavirus outbreak(COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) 
case, ‘Transportation Research Part E’ 136 (March 2020) 101922.
3 See for an overview of the development of outsourcing: J. Hätönen and T. Eriks-
son, 30+ years of research and practice of outsourcing–Exploring the past and anticipating the 
future, ‘Journal of International Management’ 15 (2009) 142‒155.
4 See for an overview of exact dates and forms of lockdown for approximately sixty 
countries, the country reports in the special issue of the ‘Italian Labour Law e-Journal’ 
on COVID-19 and Labour Law. A Global Review, (edited by B.P. ter Haar, E. Menegatti, 
I. Senatory, and E. Sychenko), available at: https://illej.unibo.it/ (accessed 21 May 2020).
5 Cf. N. Neuteboom and P. Golec, Consumers in the coronavirus era, ‘ABN AMRO’ 21 
April 2020 (statistics for the Netherlands); and Belapatiño c.s., The COVID-19 impact on 
Consumption in Real Time and High Definition, ‘BBVA Research’ 24 April 2020 (with data 
for Spain, Turkey, Mexico, the USA, Colombia, Argentina and Peru).
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has put many companies at the brink of bankruptcy had they not 
received government support.6 The instant drop in sales resulted in 
a prompt termination of contracts, even in cases when some stages 
of the production process had already been completed, e.g. fabrics 
had already been bought and cut, and the cancellation or deferral of 
planned (future) orders.7 A third challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic 
for global value chains is the (further) outbreak of the virus in the 
“sourcing” countries, particularly countries in South-East Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa,8 which will result in lower production levels in 
the plants that are not affected by the lockdowns in Europe, Australia, 
and the US.9 Although not very visible yet at the time of writing this 
article,10 it is only logical when we follow the first signals that due to 
 6 See for an overview of the different types of government measures the country 
reports in the special issue of the Italian Labour Law e-Journal on COVID-19 and Labour 
Law. A Global Review (op cit.).
 7 Among many others: A. Hossain, Coronavirus: Two million Bangladesh jobs ‘at 
risk’ as clothes orders dry up, ‘BBC Bengali’ 29 April 2020; A. Seric, H. Görg, S. Mösle and 
M. Windisch, Managing COVID-19: How the pandemic disrupts global value chains, ‘Opin-
ion on UNIDO’s Industrial Analytics Platform’ April 2020 (with specific attention 
for China); S. Meenakshi, Covid-19: It’s time to show what responsible means, ‘Fair wear 
Foundation (Stories)’, 28 April 2020, available at: www.fairwear.org/stories/covid 
-19-its-time-to-show-what-responsible-means (accessed 21 May 2020); and Clean 
Clothes Campaign, COVID-19 Demands in defence of Garment Workers in Global Supply 
Chains, 18 May 2020, available at: cleanclothes.org/news/2020/covid-19-short-term-
demands-in-defense-of-garment-workers-in-global-supply-chains (accessed 21 May 
2020).
 8 In many of these countries forms of lockdowns took place late March/early April 
2020. See: gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd 
40299423467b48e9ecf6 (accessed 21 May 2020).
 9 In general industries actually thriving well during COVID 19 include online 
(home) entertainment (e.g. Netflix, but also Nintendo, etc.), online shops like Amazon, 
online meeting platforms (e.g. Citrix, but also programmes such as MS Teams, Google 
meet, Zoom, etc.), companies producing (hand)sanitizers, and the pharmacy. Cf. J. Barro, 
The Companies That Stand to Profit from the Pandemic, ‘New York Intelligencer’ 14 April 
2020; and J. Valinsky, Business is booming for these 14 companies during the coronavirus pan-
demic, ‘CNN Business’ 7 May 2020. 
10 The NGO Clean Clothes Campaign is keeping track of the effects in the garment 
industry with daily updates in what they call a “live blog”: https://cleanclothes.org/
news/2020/live-blog-on-how-the-coronavirus-influences-workers-in-supply-chains 
(accessed 30 June 2020). See for a theoretical assessment of the pandemic’s impact on 
supply chains: D. Ivanov and A. Das, Coronavirus (COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) and supply 
chain resilience: a research note, ‘International Journal Integrated Supply Management’ 
13(1) 2020, 90–102.
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lockdowns production in Europe has dropped and caused delivery 
problems within Europe as well as in China.11 
What the COVID-19 pandemic makes conspicuous is that the econ-
omy and therewith the world of work is highly globalised, the ramifi-
cation of which are multipleinterdependencies. Of course, this in itself 
is not news. Debates about the pros and cons of the globalised econ-
omy are already ongoing for a few decades.12 What is worth indicat-
ing, however, is that the COVID-19 pandemic rather painfully revealed 
how far the globalisation has gotten and how much we have become 
dependent on one another. This was made most visible by shortages 
in personal protective equipment (PPE) for workers in the healthcare 
sector.13 In response to this, some governments, such as the Donald 
Trump administration in the US14 or the authorities in France15 have 
11 V. Hoeks, Corona onder controle? De Chinezen willen door! Hoe China werkt volgens 
‘het nieuwe normaal’ en hoe Europa daarop in kan springen, available at: leidenasiacentre.nl/
corona-onder-controle-de-chinezen-willen-door-dutch/ (accessed 23 May 2020).
12 In the field of labour law, among many other contributions: J.D.R. Craig and 
S. M. Lynk, Globalization and the future of labour law, Cambridge, CUP, 2006; B. Hepple, 
Labour Laws and Global Trade Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005; and J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischl 
and K. Klare (eds.), Labour Law in an Era of Globalization. Transformative Practices & Pos-
sibilities Oxford, OUP, 2002.
13 Cf. Oxford Business Group, The impact of Covid-19 on global supply chains, ‘COVID 
19 Economic Impact Assessment’ 24 April 2020; M. L. Ranney, V. Griffeth, and A. K. Jha, 
Critical Supply Shortages — The Need for Ventilators and Personal Protective Equipment 
during the Covid-19 Pandemic, ‘The New England Journal of Medicine’ 30 April 2020; 
382:e41; Asian Development Bank, Global Shortage of Personal Protective Equipment amid 
COVID-19: Supply Chains, Bottlenecks, and Policy Implications, ‘ADB Briefs’ 130, April 
2020; and United Nations, UN leads bid to help 135 countries get vital COVID-19 medical kit, 
amid severe global shortages 28 April 2020. Within the European Union the export of PPE 
got restricted by an ‘export authorisation’ by COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGU-
LATION (EU) 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 making the exportation of certain products 
subject to the production of an export authorisation, (OJ [2020] LI77/1.
14 Rethinking outsourcing practices were already high on the agenda of the Trump 
government, steps to reduce dependence on China seem to find firmer ground, e.g. 
H. Pamuk and A. Shahal, Trump administration pushing to rip global supply chains from 
China: officials, ‘Reuters (Business)’ 4 May 2020.
15 Minister Bruno Le Maire’s speech European industrial independence of 2 April 2020, 
available at: www.gouvernement.fr/en/european-industrial-independence (accessed on 
23 May 2020). A similar call for reshoring of production and services was made in the 
Netherlands by the Christen Democratic party (CDA), albeit that their first call for re-
shoring, made at local level, dates back to 2013 and currently is put in the context of the 
question whether the Netherlands has become too dependent on China: D. Heeringa, 
Gaan we in plaats van ‘Made in China’ vaker ‘Made in the Netherlands’ zien?, ‘Nieuwsuur 
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called to rethinking of outsourcing practices in order to assure, in the 
words of the French minister of economic affairs, “sovereign” and “in-
dependent” supplies.16 Although this is an interesting issue that will 
affect the world of work, it is a political rather than a legal problem. 
Yet, an issue that is much less discussed at the political level, despite 
being of no less importance, is the question about the responsibility of 
MNEs for their workers throughout their global supply chains in these 
times of the COVID-19 pandemic.17 This is not only a political, but 
also a legal question when addressed in the context of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), with the above mentioned international instru-
ments recognising that MNEs should avoid causing or contributing 
to adverse impacts18 or seek to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact 
when such can directly be linked to their operations, products or ser-
vices via a business relationship.19
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic there is a call for MNEs 
to take their responsibility. But, one may ask, what is their responsibil-
ity exactly? This very question will be addressed in the present article. 
Thereto, the following section presents the analysis of what kind of 
responsibility MNEs are called upon at the moment. Section 3, in turn, 
continues with an analysis of the labour rights issues MNEs are ex-
pected to respect based on the three leading international public CSR 
initiatives. In other words: the analysis will be made of what exactly 
is called for and what is required. The article concludes in section 4 
with a clear indication to what extend we can expect the responsible 
business conduct (hereafter: RBC) that MNEs are called for based on 
the three leading international (public) CSR initiatives. 
For completeness sake it is noticed here that the focus of this article 
lies with the production industry, hence leaving out the service indus-
try. The service industry is faced with different challenges that seem to 
(TV programme)’ 29 May 2020; and A. Koç, Volledige Steun van de raad voor het terughalen 
van productie uit lagelonenlanden, ‘Nieuwsbrief CDA Enschede’, 15 November 2013.
16 Minister Bruno Le Maire’s speech European industrial independence (op cit.); and 
more general A. Seric, H. Görg, S. Mösle, and M. Windisch, Managing COVID-19: How 
the pandemic disrupts global value chains, ‘World Economic Forum’ 27 April 2020.
17 See references above in footnote 6.
18 Par. 10 of section II General Policies of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs.
19 Par. 11 of section II General Policies of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs.
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have a less disruptive impact on the world of work.20 Moreover, many 
of them are actually thriving rather well because of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, for example those offering internet communication platforms, 
such as: Zoom, Google Meet, Skype, etc.21 That the production indus-
try is more affected than the service industry can also be deduced from 
the outcome of the survey conducted by the employers organisation of 
the ILO on the issue of productivity: no business member in Europe 
has dropped its production capacity by 75 per cent or more, while 
more than half of them are still working at their full capacity, whereas 
14 per cent of the business members in Africa operates below 25 per 
cent of its capacity and about one third of them operates below half of 
their normal capacity.22
2. MNEs’ responsibilities as called for during 
the COVID-19 pandemic
Several issues have been addressed in the introduction in order to 
illustrate what kind of disruptions the COVID-19 pandemic is caus-
ing in the supply chains. In this section I will try to translate these 
problems in terms of MNE responsibilities in the context of CSR or 
Responsible Business Conduct (RBC). 
When talking about the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on sup-
ply chains it can be helpful to sketch a simplified supply chain to get 
an impression where and when in the supply chain as well as geo-
graphical locations disruptions have taken or will take23 place. As can 
20 E.g. tele- or remote-working; finding a work-life balance; working time (espe-
cially the right not to be connected).
21 CF. The Financial Times which devoted a special series to companies that pros-
per during the pandemic: www.ft.com/content/d298bf34-9644-4b49-be09-c775256639ba 
(accessed 25 July 2020).
22 IOE and ILO-ACT/EMP, A global survey of employer and business membership organi-
zations: Inside impacts and responses to COVID-19, published by the International Labour 
Office 29 June 2020, pp. IX‒X and p. 19.
23 Although the COVID-19 pandemic has had direct effects, many predictions are 
being made that an economic crisis will follow of which the impact is uncertain. On 
14 April 2020 Aljazeera, for example, headed an article with IMF says ‘worst recession 
since Great Depression’ is likely, including more headings about joblessness in Australia, 
debt increases in Africa, and in general a rise in the number of people being pushed 
into poverty reported by Oxfam (available at: www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/imf-worst-
recession-great-depression-200414125253286.html (accessed 30 June 2020). The OECD’s 
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be seen in Figure 1, the simplified supply chain exists of five parts raw 
materials – half products ‒ assembly – distribution – sales markets. 
To make it more concrete we can use as an illustration the produc-
tion chain of a T-shirt.24 The raw material for a T-shirt is cotton;25 half 
products are yarn and fabrics;26 assembly of a T-shirt takes place in 
sowing factories;27 the T-shirts are then transported28 from the produc-
tion place to the sales markets, which are often located in Europe, the 
US, Canada, and Australia. In the footnotes I have indicated the main 
“production” countries for each of these steps. This is helpful for an-
other element in Figure 1 namely, to make visible when and where the 
different parts of the production chains are disrupted. This is relevant, 
because the COVID-19 pandemic developed (and still does) differently 
in different regions of the world,29 consequently, MNEs’ production 
chains are disrupted at various parts of the chain and moments in 
time. Understanding this is relevant because it is of influence on the 
expectations in terms of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) in these 
times of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
economic outlook shows that the COVID-19 pandemic ‘has triggered the most severe 
recession in nearly a century’ and that the path to recovery remains uncertain but in any 
case the effects of the pandemic will be long lasting (see at: www.oecd.org/economic- 
outlook/june-2020/ (accessed 30 June 2020). 
24 Of course, also for a T-shirt this is a simplified process. For instance, it does not 
include all kinds of processes a piece of cloth can undergo, like colouring and emblazon-
ing, etc. However, for the purpose of this article this simplified process suffices. 
25 Top ten cotton-producing countries are: China, India, the US, Pakistan, Brazil, 
Uzbekistan, Turkey, Australia, Turkmenistan, and Mexico. Source: www.worldatlas.
com/articles/top-cotton-producing-countries-in-the-world.html (accessed 23 July 2020).
26 Top ten cotton yarn-producing countries are: China, India, the US, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey, South Korea, Italy, and Egypt. Top then cotton cloth-produc-
ing countries are: China, India, Russia, US, Japan, Germany, Hong-Kong, Egypt, France, 
and Romania. Source for both: www.yourarticlelibrary.com/industries/leading-produ 
cers-of-cotton-yarn-in-the-world/25406 (accessed 23 July 2020).
27 Top ten textile-exporting countries: China, Germany, Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
India, Italy, Turkey, US, Hong-Kong, Spain. Source: www.fibre2fashion.com/industry-ar 
ticle/8471/top-10-exporting-countries-of-textile-and-apparel-industry (accessed 23 July 
2020).
28 Of course, there are more staged involving transportation in the production chain 
itself, but this is one of the most visible ones.
29 This is roughly deduced from the statistical data gathered at: gisanddata.maps. 
arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6 (acces- 
sed 23 July 2020). 
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Table 1. Simplified production chain with disruption indications 
in time and per region
The grey areas in Table 1 represent the ruptures30 in parts of the 
simplified production chain caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 and 
governmental measures following the outbreak to contain the virus as 
much as possible. It clearly shows that the disruptions occur in differ-
ent moments in time. Consequently, different problematic situations in 
the production chain have arisen. 
The first rupture in supply chains is caused by the outbreak of 
COVID-19 in China which was followed by lockdowns that affected 
the productivity of Chinese companies, including those part of the 
supply chains of (Western) MNEs. As indicated in the introduction, 
this resulted, among others, in shortages of parts of products that are 
assembled in Europe. It also caused shortages of products, especial-
ly for those which demand grew exponentially, such as the personal 
protection equipment for those working in the healthcare sector. The 
second rupture is caused by an abrupt drop in demand of goods due 
to lockdowns in the countries where most of the products are being 
sold. As indicated in the introduction, this resulted in instant cancella-
tions of already placed orders and an extreme drop in the number of 
new orders. The third rupture is caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 
in regions where most of the production and resourcing countries are 
located. Thus, apart from China, Asian countries like Bangladesh, Vi-
etnam, and India, as well as Latin-American and African countries. 
Moreover, in this same period of time European countries, Australia, 
and Canada started to relax the lock down measures (most of them 
since May/June 2020),31 which meant restarting their economies result-
ing in an increase in the demand of (parts of) goods produced in those 
30 Cf. D. Ivanov and A. Das, op cit..
31 Given the fact that the response to COVID-19 in the US is vastly different from the 
other typical “sales market countries”, I leave this country out of consideration.
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countries just hit by the COVID-19 pandemic making the disruptive ef-
fect of the pandemic even more apparent.32 Besides limited production 
capacity due to governmental lockdown measures, productivity also 
decreased since more and more workers called in sick because they 
had to quarantine themselves, either because they themselves were in-
fected with the virus or they have been in close contact with someone 
infected with the virus. 
The ruptures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have a combined 
health, economic, and social impact.33 What is interesting for this ar-
ticle is to identify what problems these ruptures cause with respect 
to labour rights and which of these causes can be related to the con-
duct of MNEs. When we map the problems related to where in the 
production chain the rupture appears (see Table 1), roughly speaking, 
the following two (broadly formulated) labour law issues keep surfac-
ing: 1) occupational safety and health (OSH), including coping with 
peak working hours for those who have to work during the times of 
COVID-19, and PPE; and 2) a reduction in working hours resulting in 
furloughing or (partial) termination of the employment relationship by 
the employer. A number of scholars as well as the ILO and the Euro-
pean Union have also mentioned a heightened risk of human traffick-
ing and forced labour,34 however, this cannot be deduced from Table 1.
32 This is not much stressed in the news yet (the period of writing this article), but 
just a matter of time to become noticeable. See for example considerations in this arti-
cle about the garment industry in India: www.unido.org/stories/indias-manufacturing- 
reels-impact-covid-19 (accessed 25 July 2020). 
33 Cf. IOE and ILO-ACT/EMP, A global survey of employer and business membership 
organizations: Inside impacts and responses to COVID-19, published by the International 
Labour Office, 29 June 2020.
34 For example, J. Hughes , L. Hamzi, and R. Mashru, ‘Corporate Human Rights Due 
Diligence in times of COVID-19’, EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International 
Law 30 July 2020. See also: J. Patel and S. Child, ‘Rise in forced labour expected amid 
the Covid-19 economic crisis’, Mail&Guardian 20 June 2020; ILO, ‘COVID-19 impact on 
child labour and forced labour: The response of the IPEC+ Flagship Programme’, avail-
able at www.ilo.org/ipec-plus; and EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), ‘Stop 
labour exploitation and protect workers from COVID-19’, News Item 13 July 2020, avail-
able at www.fra.europe.eu.
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Table 2. Labour law issues stemming from ruptures in production chains35
Position in  
production  
chain causing  
the rupture
Relation with  
other parts  
of the chain
Problems in production  
chain
Labour law issues




































































When searching for reasons why global production chains seem 
particularly vulnerable on these labour rights issues, indications can 
be found that this is related to the so-called Just in Time (JIT) manage-
ment model. JIT is a management model developed by Toyota (Japan), 
35 In a similar way see: R. Baldwin and R. Freeman, ‘Supply chain contagion waves: 
Thinking ahead on manufacturing ‘contagion and reinfection’ from the COVID concus-
sion’, VoxEU.org 1 April 2020. Inspiration for this is drawn from: D. Ivanov, op cit., p. 4‒5.
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which is based on the idea of production on demand, also known as 
“make-to-order”. JIT refers to a process in which stocks are eradicated 
and every step in the production chain is tensely coordinated so it 
can be completed “just in time”.36 From a business perspective JIT of-
fers many advantages, such as the elimination of waste, and a more 
streamlined and efficient process flow.37 The downside of this lean, 
pull-based practice is that it results in almost immediate shortages of 
(certain) products such as the PPE38 which for example has hampered 
the OSH of healthcare workers who are “fighting in the frontlines 
against COVID-19”.39 In fact, research carried out before the COVID-19 
pandemic had already pointed out that JIT management is character-
ised by volatile demand of production causing structural situations of 
(excessive) overtime and insecurity of employment contracts.40 These 
effects have been amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic,41 which 
has resulted in calls for a more resilient supply chain management 
system that fits the 21st century.42 
36 F. Pisch, Managing Global Production: Theory and Evidence from Just-in-Time Supply 
Chains, ‘CEP Discussion Paper’ No 1689 April 2020, p. 2.
37 R. Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power Cambridge, CUP, 2013, p. 152.
38 See references in footnote 13.
39 This is a rhetoric that has been used by many presidents/leaders, comparing the 
COVID-19 pandemic with a war against an invisible enemy. Many measures, such as 
lockdowns and closing of schools are also only known from war situations, as such 
some parallels can be drawn. 
40 R. Locke, op cit.. See also: SOMO, ECCHR and PAX, Responsible disengagement in 
the time of corona, Position paper, April 2020, p. 2.
41 Cf. News posts on www.business-humanrights.org about COVID-19 in the sup-
ply chains; Live blog of Clean Clothes Campaign op cit.; ILO news, COVID-19 cruelly 
highlights inequalities and threatens to deepen them, 30 March 2020, available at www.ilo.
org (albeit in general, it is a well-known fact that the most vulnerable workers are found 
down in the global supply chains, exactly there where governments hardly have the 
(financial) means to adopt protective measure to cope with the consequences of 
the COVID-19 pandemic); and OECD, COVID-19 and Global Value Chains: Policy Options 
to Build More Resilient Production Networks, ‘OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus 
(COVID-19)’, 3 June 2020. Moreover, vulnerability in supply chains based on JIT man-
agement was already flagged in research before the COVID-19 pandemic, e.g. following 
one of the heaviest flooding in the history of Thailand: A. Chongvilaivan, Thailand’s 
2011 flooding: Its impact on direct exports and global supply chains, ‘ARTNeT Working Paper 
Series’, No. 113, 2011.
42 E.g. J. Sarkis, M.J. Cohen, P. Dewick, P. Schröder, A brave new world: Lessons from 
the COVID-19 pandemic for transitioning to sustainable supply and production, ‘Elsevier Pub-
lic Health Emergency Collection’, 17 April 2020 (doi: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2020.104894). 
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Another consequence that can be contributed / Another adverse 
consequence which may be attributed to the JIT-type management sys-
tem is that it involves the immediate cancellations of orders and com-
missions for new goods to be produced resulting in the termination of 
employment contracts with factory workers .43 This has raised calls for 
MNEs to show engagement and behave as socially-responsible com-
panies, not only because the factories and workers need it,44 but also 
because in the future, “when the economy is restarted again”,45 these 
factories (and workers) are much needed as their partners in the pro-
duction chains.46 Furthermore, arguments have been made that non-
responsible business behaviour may reflect badly on MNEs as “inves-
tors and consumers will look more favourably to companies that have 
sought to take an RBC approach to the crisis.”47
What the above analysis tells us, is that in terms of RBC in times 
of the COVID-19 pandemic MNEs are expected to do the following:
1.  Ensure all necessary COVID-19 OSH-measures are taken and fol-
lowed for those who continue to work.
2.  Pay speciall attention to instances of human trafficking and forms 
of forced labour, since especially migrant workers are in a highly 
vulnerable position.
3. Stay engaged with the suppliers by
a. complying with or respecting contracts; and
b. preserving jobs and securing incomes as much as possible.
4.  Transform the JIT management system into a system based on a less 
volatile demand that is more resilient and better fits the 21st century.
43 Cf. M. Anner, Abandoned? The Impact of Covid-19 on Workers and Businesses at the 
Bottom of Global Garment Supply Chains, ‘Research Report Center for Global Workers’ 
Rights’ 27 March 2020. 
44 As it becomes apparent from the blog by Clean Clothes Campaign, op cit.; a clear 
example in this respect is the situation in Bangladesh, cf. T. Donaldson, Bangladesh In-
troduces Country-Wide Lockdown, as Factories Already Face ‘Indefinite Shutdown, ‘Sourcing 
Journal’, 25 March 2020.
45 A much-heard phrase by again presidents/leaders and policy makers. 
46 Despite arguments made to change supply chain policies and calls made for 
reshoring, this may not be as simple as it seems, cf. O. Antonenko and C. McGarry, What 
the COVID-19 pandemic means for supply chains, www.ControlRisk.com, 27 May 2020 
(accessed 29 July 2020).
47 OECD, COVID-19 and Responsible Business Conduct, ‘OECD Policy Responses to 
Coronavirus (COVID-19)’, 16 April 2020, p. 11.
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Although several guidelines or self-assessment tools have been 
published by international48 and non-governmental organisations,49 
law and consultancy firms,50 and academics51 advising MNEs on how 
to act in times of the COVID-19 pandemic, two reservations should be 
made. First, while these guidelines and tools have several aspects in 
common, there are also differences. In itself hardly surprising, since 
each of these organisations has its own aims and reasons for issuing 
the guidelines and tools. With such a plurality of guidelines and tools 
of which none is more authoritative than the other, it is not an easy 
task for MNEs to understand what the best or expected course of ac-
tion is. Second, it is easy to say what to do afterwards, but what was 
expected from MNEs at the moment COVID-19 became pandemic, in 
other words, what were MNEs already expected to do in the CSR poli-
cies, especially with respect to their suppliers, subcontractors, etc. that 
are part of their production chain? This question, concerning the ex-
pected Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) will be addressed in the 
next section. 
48 E.g. OECD, ‘COVID-19 and Responsible Business Conduct’ (op cit.); UN Develop-
ment Programme, Human Rights Due Diligence and COVID-19: Rapid Self-Assessment for 
Business, available at www.undp.org; and the ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of 
work, available at www.ilo.org, with the fifth (update) published on 30 June 2020. 
49 E.g. SOMO, ECCHR and PAX, op. cit.; Fair Labour Association, COVID-19 PAN-
DEMIC GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: Workplace-Level Preparations and Safeguards, available 
at www.fairlabor.org; Responsible Business Alliance, Responsible Business Conduct Dur-
ing The Covid-19 Crisis, available at www.responsiblebusiness.org; ISO has compiled 
a list with measures to support efforts in dealing with COVID-19, some are also inter-
esting from a labour law perspective, especially regarding OSH, these are available at 
www.iso.org. 
50 E.g. www.ControlRisk.com (op cit.); Deloitte, COVID-19 Managing supply chain risk 
and disruption, available at www.deloitte.com; and Price, Waterhouse, Coopers (PWC), 
with information and guidelines on global level (available at www.pwc.com) and per 
region/country; and A. Dangova Hug, Tool on (Children’s) Right to Health and Businesses 
– Unpacking the Human Rights Due Diligence Standard, INTER PARTES Skopje (available 
at www.interpartes.mk – and promoted by the Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre (www.business-humanrights.org)). 
51 For example, M. Anner, op cit.; J. Sarkis, M.J. Cohen, P. Dewick, and P. Schröder, 
op cit.. Albeit these scholarly articles are more forward looking with the aim to prevent 
future vulnerable situations encountered in these times.
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3. MNEs’ responsibilities under the ILO MNE Declaration, 
the OECD Guidelines, and the UN Guiding Principles
3.1. General remarks
To understand what could have been expected from MNEs with 
respect to their production chains at the time COVID-19 became pan-
demic, we need to understand what kind of RBC was expected from 
them. As already mentioned in the introduction, three international 
(quasi-)legal initiatives, mentioned in the title of this section, are con-
sidered the most authoritative in this sense, hence, we need to analyse 
their content to understand what kind of RBC was expected.52 Before 
analysing these initiatives, a few remarks need to be made concerning 
these initiatives.
The first remark concerns the fact that these initiatives are legally 
non-binding. Although they are directly addressed to both, states and 
MNEs, by nature and general understanding the organisations that 
have issued these initiatives can only adopt legally binding measures 
for states. One of the reasons for this limitation is the ongoing discus-
sion whether MNEs have international legal personality (ILP).53What 
is more, the choice of instrument, that is, declarations and guidelines, 
for these initiatives are in general also considered to be forms of soft 
law. Consequently, these initiatives are surrounded by voluntarism. In 
other words, states and MNEs cannot be forced to adopt and imple-
ment them and comply with these initiatives. At the same time, it does 
not mean that these initiatives are mere paper tigers.54 With CSR be-
52 Although their also exist regional initiatives, e.g. from the European Union, 
in general these initiatives follow what has been set out by these three international 
initiatives. Cf. B.P. ter Haar and A. Kun, The CSR-policy of the EU in a global context – 
with specific regard to its uneven regional implementation across Europe: in ‘Research Hand-
book on Labour, Business and Human Rights Law’, J.R. Bellace and B.P. ter Haar (eds.), 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2019, pp. 439–465.
53 See more elaborately about ILP of MNEs: A. de Jonge, Transnational Corporations 
and International Law. Accountability in the Global Business Environment, Cheltenham; 
Edward Elgar, 2011; and A. García-Muñoz Alhambra, B.P. ter Haar and A. Kun, Har-
nessing Public Institutions for Labour Law Enforcement. Embedding a Transnational Labour 
Inspectorate within the ILO, ‘International Organizations Law Review’, 17(2020) 233–260.
54 See for an analysis of soft instruments in the context of CSR: M.A. Garcia-Munoz, 
B.P. ter Haar, and A. Kun, Soft on the Inside, Hard on the Outside: An Analysis of the Legal 
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coming more and more the standard behaviour as expected by share-
holders, stakeholders, and consumers, these initiatives are increasingly 
incorporated in other, legally binding, initiatives, such as procurement 
law, free trade agreements, and specific regional55 and national laws 
on child labour,56 forced labour57 and, increasingly, on due diligence.58 
This effect is also referred to as the hardening of soft law59 and, as 
a result, they have, at least, a normative effect on the (legal) practices of 
states and MNEs. Therefore, it seems apt to analyse such initiatives in 
order to understand what kind of behaviour they require from MNEs 
in general, and consequently, also in these times of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. 
Secondly, it should be noted that these initiatives seem not to oper-
ate in isolation from one another. On the contrary, following the idea 
of hybrid global governance, that is, the acknowledgement of a global 
Nature of New Forms of International Labour Law, ‘International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law & Industrial Relations’ 2011, 27(4), p. 337–363. See for a conclusion in simi-
lar vein: J.R. Bellace, From workers’ rights to human rights at work in: ‘Research Handbook 
on Labour, Business and Human Rights Law’, J.R. Bellace and B.P. ter Haar (eds.) Chel-
tenham, Edward Elgar 2019, p. 402–420.
55 The European Union for example has adopted Directive 2014/95/EU amending Di-
rective 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
certain large undertakings and groups (OJ[2014]L330/1) and works on a specific directive 
on due diligence: responsiblebusinessconduct.eu/wp/2020/04/30/european-commission-
promises-mandatory-due-diligence-legislation-in-2021/ (accessed 1 August 2020).
56 E.g. In 2017 The Netherlands adopted the Child Labour Due Diligence Law: 
www.business-humanrights.org/en/dutch-companies-issue-open-letter-in-support-of-
child-labour-regulation (accessed 1 August 2020).
57 E.g. in 2015 The UK adopted the Modern Slavery Act: https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted (accessed 1 August 2020).
58 E.g. In 2017 France adopted the Law on Due Vigilance: https://www.business-hu-
manrights.org/en/france-natl-assembly-adopts-law-imposing-due-diligence-on-mul-
tinationals-to-prevent-serious-human-rights-abuses-in-their-supply-chains (accessed 
1 August 2020); and by the end of 2020 a referendum is planned in Switzerland to adopt 
a law on due diligence: N. Bueno, The Swiss Popular Initiative on Responsible Business From 
Responsibility to Liability, in: ‘Accountability and International Business Operations: Pro-
viding Justice for Corporate Violations of Human Rights and Environmental Standards’, 
L.F.H. Enneking, I. Giesen, F.G.H. Kristen, L. Roorda, C.M.J. Ryngaert, A.L.M. Schaap 
(eds.), London, Routledge, 2018; and for a more general overview of national legisla-
tive CSR obligations: N. Bueno, Multinational enterprises and labour rights: concepts and 
imlementation, in: ‘Research Handbook on Labour, Business and Human Rights Law’, 
J.R. Bellace and B.P. ter Haar (eds.) Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2019, p. 421–438.
59 Similar: J. Hughes, L. Hamzi and R. Mashru, op cit..
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space in which various regulatory activities coexist in various interac-
tions with each other, these three initiatives seem to be complementary 
to one another and even show signs of transformation, rather than be-
ing rivalry.60 This means that the combined expectations laid down in 
these initiatives plays to each other’s strengths61 and hence the meaning 
of these initiatives in terms of normative effect on the (legal) practice of 
States and MNEs. Moreover, and as third and last preliminary remark, 
it should be noted that it seems that MNEs refer to these initiatives 
in their CSR policies.62 Sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. In 
a previous study on these initiatives I found that out of the twenty 
MNE CSR codes of conduct included in the research sample, only four 
of them (4) made no reference at all to any of those initiatives.63 Regard-
ing International Framework Agreements (IFAs), all those included in 
the sample refer to at least one of the initiatives central in this section.64 
Thus, albeit with some reservations, it can therefore be presumed that 
these initiatives do matter in MNEs’ CSR practices. Therefore, it makes 
sense to analyse the content of these initiatives to understand what 
behaviour of MNEs could have been expected regarding the situation 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Having established that the three initiatives central in this section 
matter for the MNEs’ CSR practices it is time to turn to their con-
tent. More particularly, the analysis of the three initiatives will be fo-
cussed on the four aspects identified in the previous section, in short: 
1. COVID-19 OSH-measures; 2. human trafficking and forced labour; 
3. engagement in terms of a. complying with or respecting contracts 
and b. preserving jobs and securing incomes; and 4. use of a resilient 
(production) demand system (instead of JIT).
3.2. COVID-19 OSH-measures
Of course, we cannot expect to find specific COVID-19 OSH meas-
ures in the initiatives, however, we can analyse to what extend it was 
60 Cf. B.P. ter Haar, Love, Flirt or Repel: Hybrid global governance of the ILO core labour 
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to be expected that MNEs would have included OSH as part of their 
RBC. Such would for example be the case if OSH in general is ac-
knowledged as one of the material issues that should be covered by 
their CSR policies. In general, the OECD Guidelines and the UNGPs 
cover the ILO’s core or fundamental labour standards,65 i.e. the aboli-
tion of forced labour and child labour, equality of opportunity and 
treatment, and the freedom of association, including the right of col-
lective bargaining. These standards have been declared as fundamen-
tal by the ILO in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.66 More interestingly, in its follow-up document to 
the 1998 Declaration, the ILO included an annual review procedure 
for all Member States that have not ratified the Conventions dealing 
with these fundamental standards .67 The underlying idea is that these 
standards are core or fundamental to achieve the ILO’s mission as set 
out in its Constitution and the Philadelphia Declaration.68 
While in scholarly debate the 1998 Declaration was received with 
mixed expectations,69 interesting for our analysis is that if MNEs make 
references to ILO documents in their CSR policies, by far most of them 
are made to the 1998 Declaration.70 As such, Langille’s argument that 
the 1998 Declaration would make it more easy for States and other ac-
tors to pick up on these principles and standards, proved to be right. 
However, there is also some sence in Alston’s comments, because the 
practice of referring to the 1998 Declaration has resulted in signifi-
cantly less attention for any of the other standards, with OSH being 
one of them.
65 Commentary 39 OECD Guidelines; and Principle 12 UN GPs.
66 Available at www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm.
67 ILO Rules of the Game An introduction to the standards-related work of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (Centenary edition 2019), available at www.ilo.org, p. 120.
68 Preamble and Article 1 of the 1998 Declaration.
69 Ph. Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International La-
bour Rights Regime, ‘European Journal of International Law’ 2004, 15(3), p. 457–521; 
B.A. Langille, Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to Alston), ‘European Journal 
of International Law’, 2005, 16(3), p. 409–437; F. Maupain, Revitalization not Retreat. The 
Real Potential of the 1998 ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 
‘European Journal of International Rights’, 2005, 16(3), p. 439–465; and Ph. Alston, Fac-
ing Up the Complexities of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda, ‘European Journal of 
International Law’ 2005, 16(3), p. 467–480.
70 Cf. Ter Haar, op cit.. 
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In addition to the ILO’s fundamental labour standards, the OECD 
Guidelines and the UN GPs also refer to the UN’s International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,71 which does include 
OSH.72 The OECD Guidelines also refer to the ILO’s MNE Declara-
tion, albeit more for its terminology rather than material content.73 
Additionally, when it comes to the ILO and CSR, it is not the 1998 
Declaration that is the most relevant initiative, indeed it is the MNE 
Declaration.74 The MNE Declaration is contextualised in the setting of 
the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda.75 The Decent Work Agenda is based 
on four pillars (employment creation, social protection, rights at work, 
and social dialogue), which resonates well with the UN’s 2030 Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 8.76 In its Centenary 
Declaration77 the ILO seems to move even further away from a “fun-
damental labour standards promoting approach”, towards a more in-
tegral approach based on an inclusive interpretation of Decent Work.78 
From all this there are two takeaways that are relevant to our analysis. 
Firstly, the MNE Declaration includes OSH (and working time) as part 
of “Conditions of work and life”.79 Secondly, with a (seemingly) shift 
from a fundamental labour standards centred promotional approach 
to a more integral and inclusive decent work approach, MNEs are ex-
pected to follow a more integral and inclusive approach as well. 
In addition to the above, if we take a wider approach and review 
research on CSR and OSH, we find a number of studies dealing par-
ticularly with the topic in question. One of them is interesting to us,80 
since it illustrates that the influence on MNEs’ CSR policies is clearly 
71 Commentaries par. 39 OECD Guidelines; and Commentary on Principle 12 UN GPs.
72 Art. 7(b) ICESCR (available at: www.ohchr.org). 
73 Paras. 48–49 Commentaries OECD Guidelines.
74 Available at: www.ilo.org/empent/areas/mne-declaration/WCMS_570332/lang--
en/index.htm. 
75 For a brief explanation about Decent Work see: www.ilo.org/global/topics/de 
cent-work/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 1 August 2020). 
76 See more about the SDGs at sdgs.un.org/goals (accessed 1 August 2020). 
77 ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work, adopted by the Conference at its 
One Hundred And Eighth Session, Geneva, 21 June 2019, available at www.ilo.org. 
78 Cf. Par. B, Section I Centenary Declaration.
79 Articles 42–47 MNE Declaration.
80 M.J. Montero, R.A. Araque, J.M. Rey, Occupational health and safety in the framework 
of corporate social responsibility, ‘Safety Science’ 2009, Vol. 27, p. 1440–1445.
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not limited to these three initiatives.81 In their study Montero et al. 
give special relevance to SA8000.82 Taking this one step further and 
performing a very brief check on to what extend we find OSH-issues 
in MNE’s CSR policies, we can see that it seems to be more often part 
of it than not. For this assessment I have relied on two sources. The 
first is a list of IFAs included in the Appendix in a book on the impact 
of IFAs.83 Out of the 82 IFAs that are listed, 64 (which is 78%) include 
OSH-issues and 48 (which is 58%) include working time.84 The second 
is the database available at www.csrhub.com, which rates and ranks 
MNEs on several aspects of CSR, including “Employees” which, in 
turn, includes OSH.85 Interestingly, the impression we can get from 
data that is freely available,86 is that OSH is relatively often part of the 
CSR policies.87 
To conclude, in terms of expected responsible business conduct based 
on the OECD Guidelines, the UN GPs and the ILO MNE Declaration it 
is to be expected that MNEs consider OSH as part of their CSR. That this 
is indeed the fact, in practice seems to be confirmed by the very brief 
assessment of (very limited) available data of two sources.
3.3. Human trafficking and forced labour
Compared to OSH, human trafficking and forced labour is much 
easier to identify in the context of CSR, since it is one of the four labour 
standards that have been declared fundamental by the ILO. Hence, all 
three initiatives include the abolition of forced labour among the topics 
they promote.88 All three make general references to the ILO Conven-
81 Not that I have claimed this, but it underlines the limitation of this study with 
a focus on only these three initiatives.
82 See at sa-intl.org/programs/sa8000/.
83 K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International 
Framework Agreements. New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
84 Ibidem, Table 2 Substantive provisions in international framework agreements.
85 esg.csrhub.com/csrhub-data-schema (accessed 2 August 2020). 
86 Which is far from representative, but it is about what the inclusion of OSH as key 
aspect signals.
87 content.csrhub.com/files/dash/CSRHub+Dashboard+Competitor+Benchma
rk--2019-03-28.pdf (accessed 2 August 2020).
88 More specifically: Guideline V1d) OECD Guidelines; Commentary on Guid-
ing Principle 12 UN GPs; and General Principle 9 and for MNEs specifically Principle 
25 ILO MNE Declaration.
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tions on forced labour, namely, C29 and C105. Apart from the Conven-
tions, the ILO has also adopted two Recommendations (R35 and R203) 
and a Protocol (P29) on the issue of forced labour.89 Forced labour is 
defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under 
the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not of-
fered himself voluntarily.’90 The question is whether forced labour as 
understood by the ILO also includes human trafficking, particularly in 
relation to migrant workers.91 
Convention C29 does not mention trafficking, however, Article 1(3) 
P29 repeats the definition of C29 and adds to this that it also includes 
government action ‘against trafficking in persons for the purposes of 
forced or compulsory labour.’ However, none of the CSR initiatives ad-
dress migrant workers or a more specific duty to care for migrant work-
ers, who, as is common knowledge, often are in a position that makes 
them vulnerable for trafficking and forced labour. Moreover, Principle 
18 of the ILO’s MNE Declaration stipulates that MNEs ‘should give 
priority to the employment, occupational development, promotion and 
advancement of nationals of the host country at all levels in coopera-
tion […].’ And although this is understandable from the assumption that 
outsourcing activities of MNEs (also) have a positive impact,92 the focus 
on nationals of the host country inherently includes the risk of deter-
ring attention from migrant workers. Of course, such topics as human 
trafficking and forced labour are not limited to country nationals only, 
however, there is also no particular incentive to direct activities to pre-
vent or mitigate adverse impacts on migrant workers. 
Coming back to the topic of forced labour, we can see that Article 
2(e) P29 requires states to adopt measures that support ‘due diligence 
by both the public and private sectors to prevent and respond to risks 
of forced or compulsory labour.’ Something only a few states have act-
ed upon, as indicated in the preliminary remarks to this section. In the 
ILO’s MNE Declaration we can read that companies are expected to 
‘take immediate and effective measures within their own competence 
to secure the prohibition and elimination of forced or compulsory la-
89 All available in Normlex at www.ilo.org.
90 Art. 2(1) C29.
91 Migrant workers since they have been identified as the workers most at risk of 
forced labour in these times of the COVID-19 pandemic (see above).
92 Principle 1 ILO MNE Declaration.
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bour in their operations.’93 How they should do this is worked out 
in Principle 10, which refers to the UN GPs (as do the OECD Guide-
lines94), among which is (included) the role of MNEs to respect hu-
man rights.95 Based on all the three initiatives, MNEs are required to: 
‘(i) avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts through their own 
activities, and address such impacts when they occur; and (ii) seek 
to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business rela-
tionships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.’96 MNEs 
‘should carry out due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate and ac-
count for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts 
that relate to internationally recognized human rights.’97 In order to 
address the identified adverse impacts (or risks) MNEs are encouraged 
to have meaningful consultations with stakeholders, especially with 
trade unions or other forms of workers representation doing justice to 
the freedom of association and collective bargaining.98 However, the 
UN GPs and OECD Guidelines only mention “stakeholders” without 
a direct specification of the role of workers’ representatives.99 Indirectly 
a reference to a role as stakeholder by workers’ representatives can be 
found in the explanation on how the OECD Guidelines and the MNE 
Declaration are linked to each other: 
The OECD Guidelines and the ILO MNE Declaration refer to the be-
haviour expected from enterprises and are intended to parallel and 
not conflict with each other. The ILO MNE Declaration can therefore 
be of use in understanding the Guidelines to the extent that it is of 
a greater degree of elaboration.100
 93 Principle 25 ILO MNE Declaration. 
 94 Commentary 36 OECD Guidelines.
 95 Which stems from the Ruggie Framework “Protect, Respect, Remedy” and that 
forms the backbone of the UN GPs. Cf. General Guiding Principle of the UN GPs. 
 96 Principle 10(c) ILO MNE Declaration; Guiding Principle 13 UN GPs, which are 
the same as General Policies Guidelines 11 and 12 and Commentaries 17–20 OECD 
Guidelines.
 97 Principle 10(d) ILO MNE Declaration; Guiding Principles 17, 18 and 19 UN GPs, 
and resonates Guideline 10 and Commentaries 14, 15 and 16 OECD Guidelines.
 98 Principle 10(e) ILO MNE Declaration.
 99 Cf. Guiding Principle 18(b) UN GPs; and Guideline 14 OECD Guidelines
100 Commentary 48 OECD Guidelines.
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To summarise, MNEs are expected to deal with the issue of human 
trafficking and forced labour, as in not to contribute to it directly or to 
prevent or mitigate it when indirectly involved. The way they are ex-
pected to do this is via activities that meet the requirements of due dili-
gence and involve stakeholders, among which workers’ representatives. 
3.4. Engagement 
The issue of engagement is divided into two topics. The first one 
concerns compliance with or respecting contracts rather than using 
force majeure as an argument to terminate contracts at any stage. The 
second topic is the preservation of jobs and securing incomes when it 
is not possible to keep workers employed.
The first topic, respecting supplier contracts, is actually a question 
of engagement, or better of disengagement. On first glance the OECD 
Guidelines give us the best insight into this issue.101 The most relevant 
text we can find in the OECD Guidelines is Commentary 22, which 
gives further explanation to the expectation of MNEs to prevent or 
mitigate their direct and indirect adverse impacts on human rights. 
The commentary reads as follows:
Appropriate responses with regard to the business relationship may 
include continuation of the relationship with a supplier throughout 
the course of risk mitigation efforts; temporary suspension of the re-
lationship while pursuing ongoing risk mitigation; or, as a last re-
sort, disengagement with the supplier either after failed attempts at 
mitigation, or where the enterprise deems mitigation not feasible, or 
because of the severity of the adverse impact. The enterprise should 
also take into account potential social and economic adverse impacts 
related to the decision to disengage.
Relevant in the context of this study is that this commentary makes 
clear that disengagement is considered to be a measure of last resort. If 
101 The UN GPs only refer to an? MNE/MNEs? to use its leverage to prevent or 
mitigate adverse impacts on human rights. When such is really not possible, an MNE 
should terminate (dis-engage) its involvement. Cf. GP 19 and commentary UN GPs. 
Since on this point the ILO MNE Declaration refers to the UN GPs it provides no further 
insights. 
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all efforts to mitigate fail, then disengagement could maybe be consid-
ered. On top of this, the enterprise should also take into account social 
and economic adverse impacts that will be the consequence of the dis-
engagement. The OECD Guidelines and the UN GPs have additional 
explanatory documents regarding due diligence and exercising lever-
age.102 The additional guidance on disengagement is not very helpful 
as it merely repeats what is already in the explanatory commentaries 
to the guidelines, however, the UN Working Groups document refers 
to a discussion paper published by SOMO entitled “Should I stay or 
should I go?” which explores the role of disengagement in human 
rights due diligence.103 In this document it is more clearly stated that 
[j]ust as with any business decision, the UNGPs and OECD Guide-
lines expect companies to conduct due diligence on potential adverse 
impacts of disengagement. That is, they should identify potential ad-
verse human rights impacts resulting from the decision to disengage 
and seek to prevent or mitigate those potential impacts.104
Adverse impacts include for instance loss of jobs for workers, loss 
of tax revenues, and other potential local economic impacts resulting 
from a hasty departure.105 A simple application of these expectations 
to the COVID-19 pandemic situation in which MNEs have terminated 
supplier contracts abruptly would lead to the conclusion that this is 
at least a form of irresponsible disengagement. However, when re-
viewing these expectations in the wider context of human rights due 
diligence, these rules seem to apply only in the situation of adverse 
impacts on human rights. The COVID-19 pandemic has adverse im-
pacts on human rights, but not the kind that is meant by these rules. 
Hence, the question remains whether COVID-19 as such could count 
102 For the UN GPs this is the report to the UN’s General Assembly by the Working 
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 17/4 and 35/7, 
16 July 2018, available at www.ohchr.org; and for the OECD Guidelines this is the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business, available at https://mneguide-
lines.oecd.org.
103 Dated April 2016 and available at www.somo.nl. 
104 SOMO, Should I stay or should I go?, Discussion Paper (April 2016), 6 (available at 
www.somo.nl).
105 Ibidem.
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as a cause for disengagement in the context of these guidelines. If yes, 
there is an expectation that they disengage in a responsible manner, if 
no, COVID-19 is not an accepted cause for disengagement at all and 
the expectation is that MNEs would simply stay engaged. 
Although the guidelines in the three initiatives are not decisive in 
what is to be expected from MNEs in general terms of engagement, 
it can be concluded that either COVID-19 is no cause for disengage-
ment, and if it is it should be done in a responsible, so a due diligence 
manner. With this in mind we can now move on to the second issue: 
preserving jobs and securing incomes.
One of the consequences of disengagement, or termination of sup-
plier contracts, is that many suppliers had to terminate employment 
relationships with their workers. This had (and at the moment of writ-
ing this article, still has) a huge impact on the lives of those workers 
since the loss of the job also means the loss of the only or main source 
of income.106 In many home countries of the suppliers there are no 
alternative sources of income such as unemployment benefits or social 
assistance.107 In some countries this has resulted in not only a health 
and economic crisis, but also in a humanitarian crisis.108 Hence the 
strong call on MNEs to preserve jobs and secure incomes. But what is 
expected from MNEs on this? We already know there is some expecta-
tion of MNEs to stay engaged with their suppliers and that disengage-
ment may either not be acceptable under human rights due diligence 
or subject to an assessment on the adverse impacts of it. But what 
about the obligation of MNEs to preserve jobs and secure incomes?
The OECD Guidelines and UN GPs do not address this at all. Not 
a surprise, since materially their scopes are limited to the ILO’s fun-
damental labour standards.109 If any thing could be found in these two 
initiatives it is only by a positive interpretation of the prohibition of 
106 Cf. Clean Clothes Campaign, Garment workers need apparel companies’ assurance 
that they will be paid during this crisis, published 1 June 2020, available at cleanclothes.org.
107 See above. See also: A video by Guy Ryder Social protection a vital part of the pan-
demic response (available at www.ilo.org – COVID-19 and social protection); and more 
generally the ILO’s webpage on social protection where it is stated that merely 27% of 
workers around the world have access to social protection: www.ilo.org/global/topics/
social-security/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 3 August 2020).
108 L. Schnirring, Global COVID-19 total nears 14 million amid appeal for nations in 
crisis, ‘CIDRAP News’ 17 July 2020. 
109 See above on the issue of OSH.
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forced labour, namely, the right to freely choose work and with that 
a positive obligation for states to make efforts to achieve full employ-
ment.110 However, this is an expectation of the behaviour of States, 
what about MNEs? Principle 16 of the ILO’s MNE Declaration stipu-
lates that MNEs, ‘particularly when operating in developing countries, 
should endeavour to increase employment opportunities and stand-
ards.’ Moreover, in terms of income security, MNEs are stimulated 
to complement ‘public social security systems and help to stimulate 
further their development, including through their own employer-
sponsored programmes.’111 The most interesting principle in the ILO’s 
MNE Declaration though is number 33 which reads as follows: 
Multinational enterprises as well as national enterprises, through 
active employment planning, should endeavour to provide stable 
employment for workers employed by each enterprise and should 
observe freely negotiated obligations concerning employment stabil-
ity and social security. In view of the flexibility which multinational 
enterprises may have, they should strive to assume a leading role in 
promoting security of employment, particularly in countries where 
the discontinuation of operations is likely to accentuate long-term 
unemployment.
Providing stable employment and promoting security of employ-
ment could be interpreted as “preserving jobs.” Albeit such an inter-
pretation is reserved for the ILO’s Governing Body,112 it may not be 
too much of a stretch. Particularly not when reading it in conjunction 
with Principle 34, which resonates the due diligence approach of the 
general expectations on disengagement.113
110 Cf. Article 11 ILO Recommendation R205 ‒ Employment and Decent Work for 
Peace and Resilience Recommendation (2017).
111 Principle 22 ILO MNE Declaration.
112 Annex 2 to the ILO MNE Declaration Operational Tools, Section 3 Procedure for 
the examination of disputes concerning the application of the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by means of interpre-
tation of its provisions (interpretation procedure). 
113 Principle 34 ILO MNE Declaration reads: ‘In considering changes in operations 
(including those resulting from mergers, takeovers or transfers of production) which 
would have major employment effects, multinational enterprises should provide rea-
sonable notice of such changes to the appropriate government authorities and repre-
sentatives of the workers in their employment and their organizations so that the im-
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3.5. Replacing just-in-time management with a resilient 
(production) demand system
The last issue that surfaced during the COVID-19 pandemic is the 
call for a more resilient (production) demand system. The current 
prevailing system of Just-In-Time (JIT) management has proven to be 
vulnerable in two ways: instant shortages of (essential) products and 
immediate cancellation of orders (termination of contracts with sup-
pliers, resulting in many instances of the termination of employment 
contracts).114 So, the question has to be asked: What is expected from 
MNEs in this respect? 
To understand what is expected from MNEs in terms of manage-
ment strategy, we have to first look at what is exactly understood by 
human rights due diligence. As Trebilcock has showed in her disquisi-
tion of due diligence, human rights due diligence is not the same as 
how due diligence is understood in corporate law.115 The first para-
graph of explanation to Guiding Principle 18 of the UN GPs116 is very 
instrumental in understanding this. In full it reads:
The initial step in conducting human rights due diligence is to iden-
tify and assess the nature of the actual and potential adverse human 
rights impacts with which a business enterprise may be involved. 
The purpose is to understand the specific impacts on specific people, 
given a specific context of operations. Typically this includes assess-
ing the human rights context prior to a proposed business activity, 
where possible; identifying who may be affected; cataloguing the 
relevant human rights standards and issues; and projecting how the 
proposed activity and associated business relationships could have 
adverse human rights impacts on those identified.
plications may be examined jointly in order to mitigate adverse effects to the greatest 
possible extent. This is particularly important in the case of the closure of an entity 
involving collective lay-offs or dismissals.’ 
114 See section 2.
115 A. Trebilcock, Due Diligence on labour issues – Opportunities and limits of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in: ‘Research Handbook on Transna-
tional Labour Law, A. Blackett and A. Trebilcock (eds), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2015, p. 93–107.
116 Similar to engagement the ILO’s MNE Declaration does not add much to this as 
it refers to the UN GPs on this point. 
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Essential in this explanation is that typical for the first step in hu-
man rights due diligence is that the MNE assesses the human rights 
context prior to a proposed business activity. One caveat though. From 
the quoted fragment it is not clear what is meant by “a proposed busi-
ness activity” or business operations. The OECD is more elaborate on 
this in point 2.1 of the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Busi-
ness Conduct which clarifies that MNEs are expected ‘to carry out 
a broad scoping exercise to identify in all areas of the business, across 
its operations and relationships, including in its supply chains, where 
RBC risks are most likely to be present and most significant.’ This in-
cludes, among others, information about sectoral, geographic, prod-
uct, and enterprise risk factors. Information about sectoral elements 
could for example be ‘products and their supply chains, services and 
other activities,’ and about geography ‘governance and rule-of-law, 
conflict, pervasive human rights or environmental adverse impacts.’117 
It becomes clearer in the last point on “practical actions”, which is 
about updating the assessment when the MNE changes something in 
its operations, such as ‘operating in or sourcing from a new country; 
developing a new product or service line that varies significantly from 
existing lines; changing the inputs of a product or service; restructur-
ing, or engaging in new forms of business relationships (e.g. mergers, 
acquisitions, new clients and markets).’118
What we get from this is that “business operations” does not seem 
to include impacts of the modus operandi applied in the execution of 
the activities. Hence, it does not seem to require an impact assessment 
of the model that is used to govern the activities, such as JIT manage-
ment. If I understand this correctly, it is a serious shortcoming of these 
guidelines. Not only has the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the conse-
quence of JIT management in times of crisis, but also from a labour 
rights point of view several adverse impacts are obvious consequences 
of JIT management as modus operandi. 
As already elaborated on in Section 2, the JIT management is char-
acterised as a production on demand system to minimise stocks. Con-
sequently, orders are placed as late as possible resulting in high time 
pressure on the production. Part of the JIT management also involves 
117 Point 2.1, sub b OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct. 
118 Ibid. Point 2.1, sub g. 
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short-term contracts with suppliers. It is not uncommon that per pro-
duction activity a separate commission contract is concluded. This 
makes it difficult for suppliers to manage their workload. One effect 
is that suppliers overbook themselves which results in sub-contracting 
practices to among others, companies that do not care much about 
human rights (sometimes characterised as sweatshops) or to home-
workers (which enhances the risk of child labour). Another effect is 
that (excessive) overtime needs to be made to meet the production 
deadlines, and it is a well-known fact that the number of workplace ac-
cidents grows exponentially with the number of working hours. A last 
effect to mention here is that because the supplier operates in uncer-
tainty about commissions, he, as an employer, is limited in his options 
to engage in secure employment relationships with the majority of his 
workers. Hence, many workers have to enter into short-time contracts.
The picture that we see emerge from JIT management as modus 
operandi for the business operations is one filled with uncertainty and 
(potential) adverse impacts on human rights. Moreover, it affects three 
out of the four issues addressed in this article: OSH; engagement; and 
employment security. Unfortunately, this is an under-researched topic 
in labour law, which makes it difficult to substantiate these adverse 
impacts of JIT management.119 However, even when this cannot be sub-
stantiated, due diligence requires MNEs to ‘identify, prevent, mitigate 
and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse 
impacts […].’120 The relevant word here is “potential” adverse impacts 
resulting from the MNEs’ activities. Potential refers to the impact it 
could have even though it has not manifested itself yet. The question 
is whether “potential” also refers to impacts that exists in theory only. 
There are no clear indications for the latter, but even if there were, 
it would not help us much, because the term “business operations” 
doesn’t encompass the modus operandi of those activities. As such the 
conclusion must be that there is no expectation of MNEs to change JIT 
management as their main modus operandi into a less volatile demand 
system that is more resilient and fits the 21st century.
119 In fact, I am not aware of any study making these links so clear, also not in other 
disciplines. 
120 Commentary 14 OECD Guidelines.
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4. Concluding remarks 
Following strong moral appeals to MNEs to behave socially respon-
sible regarding their supply chains, we started with the question what 
kind of RBC is expected from MNEs in these times of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The focus of this question are labour rights. To understand 
what MNEs are called upon to do we analysed those calls and trans-
lated them into labour rights issues. By tracing ruptures in production 
processes, it was possible to identify the labour rights issues, albeit in 
sketchy manner. The issues that kept surfacing in this analysis are: oc-
cupational safety and health (OSH), including coping with peak work-
ing hours for those who have to work during the times of COVID-19, 
and PPE; and a reduction in working hours resulting in furloughing 
or (partial) termination of the employment relationship. As third is-
sue mentioned by some is a heightened risk of human trafficking and 
forced labour. For the purpose of the analysis in Section 3 these issues 
were re-formulated in terms of expected RBC in times of the COV-
ID-19 pandemic. 
With respect to the first expected RBC, to ensure all necessary COV-
ID-19 OSH-measures are taken and followed for those that continue to 
work, we found that OSH in general is a recognised subject of CSR. 
Even though it is not a fundamental labour standard, it is one of the 
topics covered by the ILO’s MNE Declaration. Moreover, it is a topic 
that can be found in many MNEs’ CSR policies. Being a recognised 
topic of CSR (or RBC) in the law in the books as well as in the law in 
practice, it is an RBC that can be expected from MNEs.
Devoting special attention to human trafficking and forms of forced 
labour, especially to migrant workers who are in a heightened vulner-
able position is the second expected RBC. There is no doubt that forced 
labour is part of the CSR issues since it is one of the four fundamental 
labour standards. Because all instruments refer to the ILO Conventions 
and Recommendations, this also applies for the interpretation whether 
forced labour to also includes human trafficking. However, migrant 
workers as a target group requiring special attention are not men-
tioned. We could reason that it is not necessary because they would get 
on the radar by dealing with the issues human trafficking and forced 
labour. However, the strong focus on country nationals seems to di-
vert attention from migrant workers. Therefore, it is doubtful whether 
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MNEs can be expected to have special attention for the (heightened 
vulnerable) position of migrant workers, which is the main issue here.
The third RBC concerns issues of engagement with the suppliers. 
In this respect we found that in general there exists a strong expecta-
tion of MNEs to stay engaged in order to prevent or mitigate adverse 
impacts of their business activities: disengagement is considered to be 
a measure of last resort. Furthermore, if an MNE decides to disengage 
with its supplier, it needs to assess the social and economic adverse 
impacts thereof in accordance with the rules of due diligence. Adverse 
impacts include, among other things, loss of jobs , loss of tax revenues, 
and other potential local economic impacts resulting from a hasty de-
parture. This is exactly what happened during the COVID-19 pandem-
ic. There is one caveat though: the question is whether the COVID-19 
pandemic counts as a human right giving cause to disengagement. 
After all, it are human rights impacts that give rise to preventive and 
mitigating activities, which eventually may result in disengagement. 
If COVID-19 can be considered as giving cause for disengagement, 
the expectation is that it is done in a responsible manner. If COVID-19 
cannot be considered as giving cause for disengagement, the expecta-
tion is that the MNE stays engaged, after all there is no (human rights) 
reason for disengagement. Whatever it is, abrupt disengagement, as is 
shown during the COVID-19 pandemic, is not the expected RBC. 
The second subject of engagement that was addressed is the issue 
of preservation of jobs and securing of income. Here we found that 
the ILO’s MNE Declaration expects MNEs to contribute to both. More 
particularly, MNEs are expected to provide stable employment, or at 
least promote security of employment, and to complement ‘public so-
cial security systems and help to stimulate further their development, 
including through their own employer-sponsored programmes.’121 This 
leaves ample room to understand that RBC requires MNEs to care 
about their suppliers in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. Especially 
when combined with the general expectation of engagement.
Any expectations to change the JIT management system into a less 
volatile demand system that is more resilient and fits the 21st century, 
have perished in our analysis. Although MNEs have to assess the ad-
verse impacts of their business activities or operations, this seems not 
121 Principle 22 ILO MNE Declaration.
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to include also the modus operandi. The examples given of activities 
that should be assessed make clear that modus operandi is not among 
them. From a labour rights point of view this seems a serious short-
coming. JIT management is a cause of several (potential) adverse im-
pacts on labour rights, including (excessive) overtime, workplace ac-
cidents, employment insecurity and weak engagement. All issues that 
we also identified as issues of RBC MNEs are called upon in this time 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has merely made these is-
sues more conspicuous, but they are not new and seem to be inher-
ent to JIT management. This makes the exclusion of modus operandi as 
business operation even more of a serious shortcoming in current CSR 
policies. For now, the conclusion must be that there is no expectation 
of MNEs to change JIT management as their main modus operandi in 
a less volatile demand system that is more resilient and fits the 21st 
century. All in all, it is clear that there is more than merely a moral ob-
ligation, indeed there is a (quasi-)legal obligation for MNEs to behave 
as responsible businesses even, or especially, in these harsh times of 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
